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United States v. Arias: Can the Confrontation Clause Compel
Discovery?
Ryan Gallagher*
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 To “confront” means an
“opportunity for effective cross-examination.”2 At the very least, this
requires trial judges to give defense counsel wide latitude to question
accusers, but is freedom to question all that’s necessary for a chance at
effective cross-examination? Or, do defendants also have a right to
information necessary for effective cross-examination? If so, can the
Confrontation Clause compel the discovery of such information?
Last year in United States v. Arias the Eighth Circuit held that the
Confrontation Clause can compel discovery to guarantee an opportunity
for effective cross-examination.3 According to Judge Colloton’s dissent, the
majority’s holding created a “stark conflict in the circuits.” 4 The dissent,
along with the other circuits, thinks that an opportunity for effective crossexamination only means that the trial judge shall not impermissibly limit
the scope of questioning.5 As long as the defense gets the chance to ask
questions freely, the right to confrontation is satisfied.
Since Crawford, most of the Supreme Court Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has focused on what constitutes a “testimonial” statement,6
but the Supreme Court has not recently addressed what constitutes an
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)
3
4

936 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 802 (Colloton, J., dissenting)
Id.; see also United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 179 (3d. Cir. 2019); United States v.
Sardinas, 386 F. App’x 927, 940–41 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hargrove, 382 F.
App’x 765, 774–75 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir.
2006); Isaac v. Grider, No. 98-6376, 2000 WL 571959, at *6–7 (6th Cir. 2000); Tapia v.
Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (10th Cir. 1991).
6 See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 244 (2015) (discussing post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and the annunciation of the “primary purpose” test for
determining whether evidence is testimonial).
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“opportunity for effective cross-examination.” Given the recent Eight
Circuit ruling inaugurating a circuit split, clarification from the Supreme
Court would be helpful. If the Court were to consider the issue, this article
argues that it should follow the Arias majority and hold that the
Confrontation Clause can compel discovery to guarantee an opportunity
for effective cross-examination.
What happened in Arias? A jury convicted Arias of three counts of
aggravated sexual abuse.7 K.P., the alleged victim, claimed that Arias
sexually assaulted her in a hotel room during the weekend of his sister’s
wedding.8 Before trial, the defense filed a motion to compel discovery of
K.P’s mental health records, but the trial court denied the motion because
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.9 At trial, K.P. testified that she was
diagnosed with PTSD after the alleged assault.10 Defense counsel objected
to this testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds, arguing that without
K.P’s mental health records, the defendant was denied an opportunity to
effectively cross-examine K.P. regarding her PTSD diagnosis.11 Without the
records, Arias was unable to determine whether K.P. had been diagnosed
with PTSD or whether the alleged sexual assault caused the diagnosis.12
The majority agreed with defense counsel.13 Once K.P. testified regarding
her PTSD diagnosis, “the Confrontation Clause became implicated, because
if the PTSD testimony was allowed to be weighed by the jury, the defendant
had a constitutionally protected opportunity for effective crossexamination.”14 This reasoning implies that information is a relevant factor
for determining whether an opportunity for effective cross-examination has
been provided. When a jury hears an accuser’s testimony, but defense has
been denied information necessary for a chance at effective crossexamination, the Confrontation Clause can compel discovery of that
information.

Arias, 936 F.3d at 795.
Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 796.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 799.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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This resulted in Arias. On the basis of the Confrontation Clause, the court
demanded that K.P. release her medical records for in camera review, so that
the trial court could determine whether or not she was diagnosed with
PTSD as a result of sexual assault.15 If she was diagnosed, then her
testimony was likely harmless.16 If she was not diagnosed, or another event
caused her diagnosis, a new trial may be necessary.17 Either way, what is
striking about Arias is the fact that the court ordered the documents be
produced on the basis of the Confrontation Clause.
The dissent, however, disagreed with defense counsel.18 While the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, it does not “compel discovery of information from a third
party that might assist the defendant in cross-examining a witness.”19 There
are generally two categories of Confrontation Clause cases: those involving
the admission of out-of-court statements and those involving restrictions
on the scope of cross-examination by law or by a trial judge.20 Here, neither
is relevant because the K.P. testified at trial, so it’s not an out-of-court
statement, and no law or trial judge restricted the scope of questioning. 21
The defense counsel was free to question K.P. about PTSD, and that is
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.22
But the dissent misses the fact that denying the defense information does
limit questioning. A trial judge prohibiting a line of questioning is one way
the scope of questioning can be limited, but it is not the only way.
Restricting information that could be used for cross-examination also limits
the scope of questioning. Justice Brennan put it this way: “A crucial avenue
of cross-examination also may be foreclosed by the denial of access to
material that would serve as a basis for this examination.”23 Although the
defense knew that K.P. had mental health issues, the defense did not learn

Id. at 800.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 801 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
15
16

23

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 67 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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about her PTSD diagnosis until she testified at trial.24 Without medical
records, the defense did not know whether the diagnosis was true and was
a result of the alleged assault. While the Defendant was still permitted to
question K.P. regarding her PTSD testimony, the defense had little chance
at effective cross-examination because it would be hard to know what line
of questioning to pursue without the records. And if the medical records
showed that K.P was not diagnosed with PTSD, or some other event caused
her PTSD, then the defendant was denied a crucial opportunity to impeach
his accuser regarding key testimony.
This matters because the testimony implies that a medical professional
believed K.P.’s claim about the assault, which may make the jury more
willing to believe her too. Since the case was essentially one of conflicting
testimony — Arias asserting his innocence and K.P alleging his guilt —
credibility was crucial for determining the outcome, and the medical
records were crucial for determining K.P’s credibility. And, because K.P.
brought up her PTSD diagnosis, she waived her psychotherapist-patient
privilege, so there was no reason left for denying Arias the records.
Prohibiting access to the records, then, while allowing the jury to hear K.P’s
testimony, denied Arias an opportunity for effective cross-examination.
Therefore, the Arias majority was correct in holding that the Confrontation
Clause can compel discovery in certain cases. To be sure, the holding is
limited. The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee a right to pretrial
discovery in general.25 But the clause does guarantee an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, and this was a case where such an opportunity
depended on access to information. If defendants are denied access to
information necessary to have a chance at effectively confronting an
accuser’s trial testimony, the right to confrontation becomes a mere
formality. In Crawford, Justice Scalia did much to revive the Confrontation
Clause, following the Arias majority would revive it even more by ensuring
defendants have the information necessary for a chance at effective crossexamination.
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